Private Damages Actions in EU Competition Law and Restorative Justice: Towards a New Streamlined Institutional Framework? by Cleynenbreugel, Pieter Van
15
Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019
Private Damages Actions in EU Competition Law 
and Restorative Justice: Towards a More Streamlined 
Institutional Framework?*
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel**
ABSTRACT: The transposition of Directive 2014/104 on private damages actions 
marks an important development in the setting up of a harmonised private com-
petition law enforcement regime across different EU Member States. Coupled with 
deterrence-focused public enforcement, the European Union has taken a necessary 
and welcomed step towards enhancing justice for all those individuals and competi-
tors damaged by competition law infringements. This article argues, however, that 
the current emphasis on balancing public and private enforcement of the European 
Commission focuses too little on the need and healing effects of restoration. At the 
same time, the Directive contains a promising restorative justice opening by virtue 
of its Article 18. Starting from that opening, the article will propose a more devel-
oped way forward, taking the form of the setup and development of so-called antitrust 
“trust funds”. Exploring the legal possibilities and limits of such funds, the article 
questions to what extent this approach could be a useful complementary way to over-
come the limits identified. It will be submitted that, although it is legally possible to set 
up those trust funds under EU law, important practical questions have to be addressed 
prior to doing so. Having outlined the potential features and limits of this approach, 
the article additionally calls for more and comparative research to be performed in 
this area.
KEYWORDS: EU competition law, private enforcement, Directive 2014/104, restora-
tive justice, collective actions
* Date of reception: 29 June 2019. Date of acceptance: 28 August 2019.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2019.1826.
** Professor of European Union law and Directeur, Liège Competition and Innovation Institute 
(LCII), Université de Liège, Belgium – Visiting professor of competition law, Université Paris-
Dauphine, France; pieter.vancleynenbreugel@uliege.be.
M&CLR_III_2.indd   15 02/12/2019   16:02:50
16  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019 / 15-49
1. Introduction
The transposition of Directive 2014/104 on private damages actions1 
marks an important development in the setting up of a harmonised private 
competition law enforcement regime across different EU Member States.2 
Coupled with deterrence-focused public enforcement in place for a much 
longer time3, the European Union has taken a necessary and welcomed 
step towards enhancing justice for all those individuals and competitors 
damaged by competition law infringements. The system set up by this 
Directive and its ambition to complement existing public enforcement will 
contribute to bringing more and better justice to antitrust law victims.4
Despite its obvious advancements in terms of justice for individuals, 
this article argues that the current emphasis on balancing public and pri-
vate enforcement of the European Commission focuses too little on the 
need and healing effects of restoration. As a result, the private damages 
Directive addresses some of the main concerns that gave rise to its devel-
opment only partially.
At the same time, however, Article 18 of the Directive contains an 
important opening towards setting up a more developed restorative jus-
tice-oriented institutional framework at EU and Member States level. In 
light of that opening, this article aims to push that reflection somewhat 
forward by contemplating the setup and development of so-called anti-
trust “trust funds” as alternative institutional arrangements for restora-
tive justice. By antitrust “trust funds”, the article refers more specifically 
to a private entity managed by public authorities tasked with setting up 
and developing a wide variety of restorative justice initiatives in the realm 
of competition law. Inspired by the framework of charitable trusts and 
their regulation under English law, the article calls upon public authori-
ties to investigate the development of this figure in EU competition law 
1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, [2014] OJ L349/1 (hereafter 
referred to as 2014 Directive).
2 See Max Hjärtstrom and Julian Nowag, “EU competences and the Damages Directive: The con-
tinuum between minimum and full harmonisation”, in EU Competition Litigation. Transposition 
and First Experiences of the New Regime, eds. Magnus Strand, Vladimir Bastidas and Marios 
Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2019), 4-5.
3 Wouter PJ Wils, “Private enforcement of EU antitrust law and its relationship with public 
enforcement: Past, present and future”, World Competition 40, no. 1 (2017), 3-4.
4 See also Ioanis Lianos, Peter Davis and Paolisa Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of 
EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 412.
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enforcement as well. It will be argued that trust funds could be a vehicle for 
restorative justice-focused conversations and working meetings that take 
place between offender and victim, yet mediated with some public over-
sight. Exploring the legal possibilities and limits of such funds at both EU 
and Member State levels, the article questions to what extent this approach 
could be a useful complementary way to overcome the limits identified. It 
can be submitted indeed that taking such an approach would be a useful 
way to overcome the frictions and gaps prevailing in the current public 
enforcement-private enforcement distinction underlying EU competition 
law.
In developing that argument, the article will be structured into two 
main parts. The first part summarises well-known debates on the extent 
to which the 2014 Directive complements the public enforcement system. 
Revisiting those debates, it will be argued that the current EU competition 
law enforcement framework gives rise to a narrow understanding of cor-
rective justice likely to limit the scope and ambitions of a more developed 
restorative justice-oriented competition law enforcement framework. At 
the same time, Article 18 of the Directive contains an important open-
ing to address restorative justice more prominently within the realm of 
private competition law enforcement (2.). Building on that opening, the 
article subsequently explores the legal possibilities and limits of an alter-
native restorative justice approach situated between public and private 
enforcement and takes somewhat of a more European approach to col-
lective restorative justice mechanisms: the antitrust trust fund managed 
by public authorities. The article will flag the questions associated with 
setting up such funds and the legal and practical limits that would need to 
be addressed within the context of EU legal order (3.).
It deserves to be mentioned at the outset that the claim this article makes 
is neither to abolish the current private damages action regime in place 
nor to end discussions on the usefulness and future of the introduction of 
collective actions as an alternative remedy in EU competition law enforce-
ment.5 The main aim is indeed only to explore whether, as a matter of EU 
law, setting up such trust funds could be a possibility. As a result, the 
analysis in this article is limited to EU law. Although useful comparisons 
could – and deserve to – be made between the proposals made here and 
5 Within that context, discussions on how to improve collective actions’ attractiveness also take 
place, see e.g. Charlotte Leskinen, “Collective actions: Rethinking funding and national cost 
rules”, Competition Law Review 8, no. 1 (2011): 87-121.
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U.S. collective enforcement mechanisms6, the role of trust administrators 
in the common law and the role of courts play as like-minded institutional 
actors in distributing and allocating damages to and beyond7 groups of 
damaged individuals or competitors8, this article deliberately chooses only 
to focus on the state of play in EU competition law. It is hoped that, by 
sketching at this stage the possibilities for a more developed restorative 
justice approach and the institutional developments it may require, a fruit-
ful academic and policy debate can be initiated and more developed com-
parative research efforts can be engaged in in the years to come.
2.  Private damages actions: a step forward, yet insufficiently paying 
attention to restorative justice in competition law enforcement
The adoption and transposition of Directive 2014/104 on certain rules gov-
erning actions for damages under national law for infringements of the com-
petition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union is 
a huge step forward in the setup and design of a more varied competition 
law enforcement mechanism. This section revisits the context in which the 
2014 Directive came to be (a.) prior to revisiting the focus on monetary 
compensation the Directive reflects (b.). That focus is essentially grounded 
in a corrective justice approach, although potential openness towards more 
restorative justice processes can also be found to be present (c.).
a. The context of the 2014 Directive
At the EU level, both public and private enforcement essentially have a 
complementary role to play. Public enforcement reflects above all deter-
rence-oriented procedures and processes, resulting in the imposition of 
administrative or, in some Member States, criminal fines.9 In addition, 
acceptance of commitments, immunity tools in response to leniency 
6 Promising work has been done in that regard by Zygimantas Juska, The Role of Collective Redress 
Actions to Achieve Full Compensation for Violations of European Union Competition Law (Leiden 
University PhD thesis, 2019), 237.
7 In so-called cy près or cypres settlements see, for a critical appraisal of that concept, Jennifer 
Johnston, ”Cy pres comme possible to anything is possible: How cy pres creates improper incentives 
in class action settlements”, Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 9 (2013): 277-304.
8 See, on that question, Deborah Hensler, “Can private class actions enforce marketplace regu-
lations? Do they? Should they?”, in Comparative Law and Regulation Understanding the Global 
Regulatory Process, eds. Francesca Bignami and David Zaring (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), 
238-272.
9 Michael Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law: Principles and Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 135.
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applications or other settlement techniques aim to soften a bit too restric-
tive or vigorous enforcement. Those mechanisms aim to reward those that 
bring to light uncovered competition law, yet do not as such detract from 
public enforcement’s primary ambition, which is to deter businesses from 
engaging in anticompetitive behaviour.10 Deterrence, despite being under-
stood in different ways and through different means, remains at the heart 
of public enforcement within the EU and its Member States.11
As part of private enforcement, injunctions can be brought before 
national courts asking to establish the voidness of anticompetitive agree-
ments or decisions. Injunctive relief is one of the key techniques of private 
enforcement, allowing parties to a contract or third parties to invoke the 
nullity/voidness of that contract.12 On top of those contractual remedies, 
private damages actions exist as well, either standing alone or following on 
to a public enforcement decision.13 In addition to contributing to individu-
als being compensated for harm, the mere presence of potential damages 
actions is also supposed, in a supplementary way, to have a deterrent effect 
on businesses.14 The same could be said of injunctions, allowing businesses 
to think twice before concluding an anticompetitive – void – agreement.15 
As a result, the different public and private enforcement techniques in 
vogue aim at deterrence and compensation. The way in which a legal order 
organises and balances public and private enforcement reflects, in that 
regard, a certain deterrence-compensation balance.
10 On how leniency fits deterrence, see Wils, “Private enforcement”, 33.
11 See Marco Motta, “On cartel deterrence and fines in the European Union”, European Competition 
Law Review, 29, no. 4 (2008): 209-220. The Commission makes this clear in its fining guidelines, 
see Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of 
Regulation No. 1/2003, [2006] O.J. C210/2, point 37. See also Damien Geradin and David Henry, 
“The EC fining policy for violations of competition law: An empirical review of the Commission 
Decisional Practice and the Community Courts’ judgments”, European Competition Journal 1, no. 
2 (2005): 401-473.
12 See Caroline Cauffman, “The impact of voidness for infringement of Article 101 TFEU on related 
contracts”, European Competition Journal 8, no. 1 (2012): 95-122 for an analysis of those remedies.
13 See, for a general perspective, David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in 
the EU (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 3-4.
14 Sofia Oliveira Pais and Anna Piszcz, “Package on actions for damages based on breaches of EU 
competition rules: Can one size fit all?”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 7, no. 10 
(2014), 211.
15 Lars Henriksson, “Private enforcement of public law – an inconsistent approach to remedies?”, 
in EU Competition Litigation: Transposition and First Experiences of the New Regime, eds. Magnus 
Strand, Vladimir Bastidas and Marios Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2019), 80.
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Within this enforcement context, debates on private damages actions in 
EU competition law go back to the 1960s16, yet have regained importance 
with the Banks Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven. In his Opinion, 
Van Gerven held that the infringement by a private individual of rights 
granted to other individuals under EU law could give rise to private dam-
ages actions for infringement of those EU rights.17 The Advocate General 
opined that this right could apply in the context of EU competition law – in 
particular in relation to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU – as well.18 The recogni-
tion of the possibility of damages actions in the Courage19 and Manfredi20 
judgments confirmed that private damages actions could be part of the 
EU competition law enforcement apparatus. Indeed, from that moment 
onwards, “any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered 
where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement 
or practice prohibited under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU”.21 However, “in 
the absence of [EU] rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals hav-
ing jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from 
[EU] law, provided that such rules are not less favourable than those gov-
erning similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they 
do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise 
of rights conferred by [EU] law (principle of effectiveness)”.22 As a result, 
16 European Commission, La Réparation des Conséquences Dommageables d’une Violation 
des Articles 85 et 86 du Traité Instituant la CEE, Série Concurrence No. 1 (Brussels, European 
Commission, 1966). See also Assimakos Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 163. 
See, for background also, Folkert G. Wilman, “The end of the absence? The growing body of EU 
legislation on private enforcement and the main remedies it provides for”, Common Market Law 
Review 53, no. 4 (2016), 887-888.
17 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 27 October 1993, H. J. Banks Co. Ltd v. 
British Coal Corporation, C-128/92, EU:C:1993:860, paragraph 43.
18 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 27 October 1993, H. J. Banks Co. Ltd v. 
British Coal Corporation, C-128/92, EU:C:1993:860, paragraph 44.
19 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465, para-
graph 26.
20 Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, 
C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461.
21 Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, 
C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 61.
22 Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, 
C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 62.
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absent EU harmonisation, the setup and structure of private damages 
actions remained with Member States’ procedural autonomy.23 Although 
the overall aim of such private damages actions was not explicitly con-
firmed by the Court of Justice, it can be inferred from the judgments that, 
in addition to its deterrent effect24, the overall objective of a right to com-
pensation is to guarantee individuals a right to damages, a right to be cor-
rected for the harm that has been inflicted upon them. Corrective justice, 
the reversal of wrongs, is therefore key in developing and designing such 
private damages actions.
From 2005 onwards, the Commission sought to harmonise private 
damages actions, taking the need for more deterrence and a better deter-
rence-compensation balance into account. According to the Commission, 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are “enforced both by public and private 
enforcement. Both forms are part of a common enforcement system and 
serve the same aims: to deter anti-competitive practices forbidden by anti-
trust law and to protect firms and consumers from these practices and any 
damages caused by them. Private as well as public enforcement of antitrust 
law is an important tool to create and sustain a competitive economy”.25 
Within that context, deterrence is the key objective. That is further con-
firmed by the Commission in its claim that “[d]amages actions for infringe-
ment of antitrust law serve several purposes, namely to compensate those 
who have suffered a loss as a consequence of anti-competitive behaviour 
and to ensure the full effectiveness of the antitrust rules of the Treaty by 
discouraging anti-competitive behaviour, thus contributing significantly 
to the maintenance of effective competition in the [EU] (deterrence). By 
being able effectively to bring a damages claim, individual firms or con-
sumers in Europe are brought closer to competition rules and will be more 
actively involved in enforcement of the rules”.26 Deterrence remains the 
23 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, “Embedding procedural autonomy: The Directive and national pro-
cedural rules”, in Harmonising EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond, eds. 
Maria Bergström, Magnus Strand and Marios Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 99-119; Katri Havu, 
‘Full, adequate and commensurate compensation for damages under EU Law: A challenge for 
national courts?’, European Law Review 43, no. 1 (2018): 24-46.
24 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465, para-
graph 27.
25 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules {SEC(2005) 1732}, COM2005(672) final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=EN 3.
26 Commission, Green Paper, 4.
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key objective in that understanding, in addition to and complementary 
with the original corrective justice objectives underlying the Court’s early 
steps in this field.
The subsequent preparatory documents, most notably the 2007 
Commission’s White paper on damages actions27 and the 2009 European 
Parliament Resolution that followed it28, also confirmed that posture. 
Although those documents gave rise to significant discussions on how to 
streamline public and private enforcement best, most notably in terms of 
access to leniency documents29 and the establishment of a fault by national 
judges with or without a previous decision by a competition authority30, 
the underlying objective of deterrence coupled with individuals’ ability to 
receive compensation has not been questioned since.31 A 2007 study inves-
tigating the potential impact of a private damages action instrument on 
competition law enforcement even explicitly referred to both deterrence 
and corrective justice as ambitions of EU’s private enforcement regime.
b. The compensatory focus of the 2014 Directive
The 2014 Directive also reflects this balance between deterrence and cor-
rective justice, the former playing the key role in its setup.32 According to 
the Directive’s recitals, “[a]ctions for damages are only one element of an 
effective system of private enforcement of infringements of competition 
27 European Commission, White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
{SEC(2008) 404} {SEC(2008) 405} {SEC(2008) 406}, COM2008(165)final, https://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/whitepaper_en.pdf; see also Jindrich Kloub, 
”White paper on damage actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules: Plea for a more holistic 
approach to antitrust enforcement”, European Competition Journal 5, no. 2 (2009): 515-547.
28 European Parliament, Resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2009-0187+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
29 On that problem, see Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, 
EU:C:2011:389, paragraphs 30-32, and Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. 
Donau Chemie AG and Others, C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366; see also Sven Völcker, “Case C-360/09, 
Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 14 June 
2011, nyr”, Common Market Law Review 49 (2012): 699, and Caroline Cauffman, “Access to leni-
ency-related documents after Pfleiderer”, World Competition 34, no. 4 (2011): 597-615.
30 See, on fault, Katri Havu, “Fault in EU competition law damages claims”, Global Competition 
Litigation Review 8, no. 1 (2015): 1-13.
31 See, indeed, Recital 5, 2014 Directive.
32 For an analysis on how private enforcement contributes to public market regulation, see Sara 
Landini, “Private enforcement and market regulation”, Market and Competition Law Review 2, 
no. 2 (2018): 47-71.
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law and are complemented by alternative avenues of redress, such as con-
sensual dispute resolution and public enforcement decisions that give par-
ties an incentive to provide compensation”.33 The Directive continues by 
stating that “to ensure effective private enforcement actions under civil 
law and effective public enforcement by competition authorities, both tools 
are required to interact to ensure maximum effectiveness of the compe-
tition rules”.34 Effectiveness of competition law provisions presupposes 
some kind of deterrence, coupled with the right to full compensation. The 
Directive’s provisions and presumptions included therein aim to balance 
those different objectives.
At the same time, however, the Directive does not aim to impose addi-
tional deterrence mechanisms on businesses just for the sake of deterrence. 
The Directive indeed states that its principal objective is to give victims the 
right to full compensation. Full compensation implies a person who has 
suffered harm being placed in the position in which they would have been 
had the infringement of competition law not been committed. It therefore 
covers the right to compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, plus 
the payment of interest. According to the Directive, it shall not lead to 
overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types 
of damages.35 In that understanding, the deterrent effect of the Directive 
is limited only to the threat that any individual having incurred damages 
may introduce, potentially on top of public enforcement sanctions, actions 
for the award of compensatory damages.
The 2014 Directive essentially wants to stimulate private enforcement 
as a complement to public enforcement. Although it requires Member 
States to recognise both stand-alone and follow-on actions, the latter 
seem to be preferred.36 The Directive imposes an irrebuttable presump-
tion that national competition authorities’ infringement decisions are also 
a proof of fault before the courts of that Member State.37 It establishes a 
presumption of harm and recognises indirect purchaser standing.38 Those 
presumptions and recognitions give individuals new rights and possibilities 
33 Recital 5, 2014 Directive.
34 Recital 6, 2014 Directive.
35 Article 3, 2014 Directive.
36 Ulf Bernitz, “Introduction to the Directive on competition damages actions”, in Harmonising 
EU Competition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond, eds. Maria Bergström, Magnus Strand 
and Marios Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 8.
37 Article 9, 2014 Directive.
38 Articles 12-14 and 17(2), 2014 Directive.
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to target infringing undertakings directly39, yet have also been framed in 
terms of additional deterrence instruments. A reasonable undertaking 
abiding by the law may be discouraged from entering in anticompetitive 
agreements or decision-makings when the potentiality of damages actions 
will be added to public enforcement. It is in that spirit that the Directive 
grants and conditions individuals’ rights to claim damages.
The Directive’s provisions essentially focus on introducing presump-
tions of fault, of harm, on determining how individuals can have access 
to certain evidence and how liability will be distributed between different 
infringers.40 In that context, the topic of collective actions – so-called class 
or group actions – has also popped up.41 Collective actions refer to a series 
of legal remedies that allow representatives to file claims for damages on 
behalf of a certain group of victims and to be awarded damages for the 
whole of that group.42 Those actions are well-known in the United States43, 
yet many EU Member States have some kind of collective action remedy 
on their books as well44, applicable across all fields or tailored to the spe-
cifics of competition law. Although different types of group actions exist, 
one distinguishes generally between opt-out and opt-in actions. Opt-out 
implies that an action is introduced on behalf of the whole group of vic-
tims – even those that may not be aware of the action – essentially barring 
them from introducing an individual action unless they explicitly state not 
to be willing to be part of the group action. Opt-in refers to members of 
39 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ”The presumption of harm and its implementation in the Member 
States’ legal orders”, in EU Competition Litigation: Transposition and First Experiences of the New 
Regime, eds. Magnus Strand, Vladimir Bastidas and Marios Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2019), 206-
207.
40 For a good overview, see Niamh Dunne, “Courage and compromise: The directive on antitrust 
damages”, European Law Review 40, no. 4 (2015): 581-587.
41 See, for general background, Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative 
Actions in European Legal Systems. A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Oxford: 
Hart, 2008), 324.
42 The European Commission refers to those types of actions as collective redress mechanisms, see 
European Commission, Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, [2013] O.J. L201/60, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN.
43 In the realm of competition law, see e.g. American Bar Association, Antitrust Class Actions 
Handbook, Second Edition (Washington: ABA Publishing, 2018), 388.
44 For a recent report, see the October 2018 Report requested by the European Parliament entitled 
Collective Redress in the Member States of the European Union, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/608829/IPOL_STU(2018)608829_EN.pdf.
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the group explicitly (or implicitly) having to accept being included in the 
group action.45 Those Member States that have it have often chosen not to 
take the US opt-out model, but rather an opt-in model.46 In the same way, 
recent proposals for EU collective actions in the realm of EU consumer 
protection law go in that same direction.47 Given the large variety of group 
action mechanisms, and despite their potential in terms of deterrence, the 
Commission decided not to impose this type of action in its 2014 private 
Damages Directive.48 Member States thus remained free to decide whether 
or not to introduce this possibility within the realm of EU competition 
law.49
c. Corrective and/or restorative justice?
A question that has remained largely implicit in the abovementioned 
debate concerns the question of what kind of compensatory justice the 
Directive seeks to attain. To answer that question, it is important to dis-
tinguish corrective from more general restorative justice understandings. 
Corrective justice refers to Aristotle’s idea that if one party has commit-
ted and another one has suffered that (transactional) injustice50, equality 
needs to be restored.51 Equality in that understanding consists in each 
person being given that which she/he is entitled to relatively to another 
person. Although not all persons are fully equal, societies are indeed (to 
45 On that difference, see Zygimantas Juska, “Obstacles in European competition law enforcement: 
A potential solution from collective redress”, European Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 1 (2014): 143.
46 See the October 2018 Report of the European Parliament; Portugal offers an interesting excep-
tion, see Sofia Oliveira Pais, “A first look at the Portuguese Act 23/2018 transposing the private 
enforcement Directive”, in Transposition and First Experiences of the New Regime, eds. Magnus 
Strand, Vladimir Bastidas and Marios Iacovides (Oxford: Hart, 2019), 74.
47 See, in that regard, European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, 
and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, COM2018(184) final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0184&from=EN.
48 Recital 13, 2014 Directive.
49 Also leaving room for manoeuvre for Member States. On manoeuvring room, more generally, 
see Anna Piszcz, “Room for manoeuvre for Member States: Issues for decision on the occasion of 
the transposition of the Damages Directive”, Market and Competition Law Review 1, no. 1 (2017): 
81-109.
50 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, available in English at http://classics.mit.edu/
Aristotle/nicomachaen.4.iv.html. See also Anton-Hermann Chroust and David L. Osborn, 
“Aristotle’s conception of justice”, Notre Dame Law Review 17, no. 2 (1942): 140.
51 Ernest J. Weinrib, “Corrective justice in a nutshell”, The University of Toronto Law Journal 52, 
no. 2 (2002): 349.
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be) organised in such a way that everyone is given a relative position in 
relation to each other. That starting position would constitute the baseline 
against which equality is measured. If a person gets less than their baseline 
position because another person harms them, the injustice consisting in 
this kind of baseline inequality would have to be corrected.52 Corrective 
justice consists in restoring the initial relative equality between two per-
sons by depriving one party of the gain he/she obtained at the expense of 
the other party.53 In doing so, the equilibrium in the transactional rela-
tionship between those parties can be corrected and restored.54 The injus-
tice consisting in the inequality caused by the action of one party would 
be corrected indeed. One can think of many ways to correct such inequali-
ties, yet compensation is the most important way of obtaining that result. 
Restoration of the baseline equality between different businesses or indi-
viduals is made possible by quantifying and awarding monetary compen-
sations to victims of anticompetitive behaviour.
In contrast with corrective justice, restorative justice refers to a series 
of processes aimed not only or necessarily at correcting wrongs done 
to an individual, but to a series of processes aimed at restoring the dis-
turbed equilibrium, both from a societal and an individual point of view. 
It envisages a wider array of restorative mechanisms and processes than 
a corrective justice approach does, the latter essentially focusing only on 
compensation. When corrective justice is necessarily backward-looking, 
restorative justice looks forward to ensure future infringements no longer 
take place and harmony between the different societal participants is 
restored.55 Restorative justice processes may encompass compensation as 
well, but also envisage alternative ways beyond restoring baseline equality; 
they are a more forward-looking way of justice, ensuring that similar dis-
turbances to baseline equality no longer take place in the future.
It follows from this basic distinction made between corrective and restor-
ative justice that the ambitions of the 2014 Directive essentially remain 
limited to a compensatory corrective justice approach. The main focus of 
the Directive is to restore the baseline equality and to compensate victims 
52 Weinrib, “Corrective justice”: 349-350.
53 Weinrib, “Corrective justice”: 350.
54 For an account linking corrective justice and reciprocity, see Thomas C. Brickhouse, “Aristotle 
on corrective justice”, The Journal of Ethics 18, no. 3 (2014): 187-205.
55 See John Braithwaite, “The fundamentals of restorative justice”, in A Kind of Mending: Restorative 
Justice in the Pacific Islands, ed. Sinclair Dinnen et al. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2003), 35.
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of anticompetitive behaviour by awarding them monetary damages. At 
the same time, however, the Directive also allows for consensual dispute 
mechanisms to be set up at Member State level, yet, within the spirit of 
the Directive, those mechanisms are supposed to serve the sole purpose of 
bringing an out-of-court settlement of monetary claims grounded in the 
action for damages.56
It is submitted that this consensual dispute resolution mechanism 
envisaged by the 2014 Directive opens the door towards more restorative 
justice-inspired processes as described above. Recital 48 of the Directive 
states that “[a]chieving a ‘once-and-for-all’ settlement for defendants is 
desirable in order to reduce uncertainty for infringers and injured par-
ties. Therefore, infringers and injured parties should be encouraged to 
agree on compensating for the harm caused by a competition law infringe-
ment through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-
court settlements (including those where a judge can declare a settlement 
binding), arbitration, mediation or conciliation. Such consensual dispute 
resolution should cover as many injured parties and infringers as legally 
possible”.
In practice, however, the Directive still conditions those procedures 
fundamentally within the logic of the award of compensatory damages. 
According to Article 18 of the Directive, Member States shall ensure that 
the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for 
the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process. The suspension 
of the limitation period shall apply only with regard to those parties that 
are or were involved or represented in the consensual dispute resolution. 
Member States have to ensure that national courts seized of an action for 
damages may suspend their proceedings for up to two years where the par-
ties thereto are involved in consensual dispute resolution concerning the 
claim covered by that action for damages. Consensual dispute settlements 
envisaged by the Directive appear to only be limited to determining, quan-
tifying and eventually granting an amount of damages by way of compen-
sation to the claimant of a damages action. That is evidenced by Article 19 
of the Directive, which confirms that following a consensual settlement, 
the claim of the settling injured party is reduced by the settling co-infring-
er’s share of the harm that the infringement of competition law inflicted 
upon the injured party. The rest of the share is in principle to be obtained 
56 Recital 48, 2014 Directive.
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from the non-settling parties.57 On top of that, a competition authority 
may consider compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement and 
prior to its decision of imposing a fine to be a mitigating factor.58
As evidenced by those provisions, the setup of consensual dispute set-
tlement mechanisms is largely left to Member States. The Directive, for 
its part, only considers the compensatory aspects of those consensual dis-
pute settlements. By focusing directly and only on the award of damages 
by means of compensation, the Directive implicitly risks to downplay the 
importance of other restorative justice mechanisms or tools. As such, the 
Directive’s corrective justice focus remains firmly embedded in the idea 
that compensating harmed individuals only amounts to paying them a 
sum of money in compensation. At the same time, however, the fact that 
attention is paid to consensual dispute settlements would seem to indicate 
that the EU legislature is, at least, not closing down completely on possi-
bilities for restorative justice in the realm of EU competition law. It is this 
opening that will be used to further explore whether a more institutional-
ised framework for promoting restorative justice in this field could be set 
up as a complement to the current public-private enforcement dichotomy.
3.  Taking restorative justice seriously? A proposal to set up antitrust 
“trust funds”
If one takes the claim that the Damages Directive contains at least some 
openness to more structured restorative justice processes seriously, the 
current setup and structure of that Directive can hardly be considered suf-
ficient. Although private damages actions partially contribute to individu-
als’ sense of justice, taking restorative justice seriously and overcoming the 
gaps identified in the previous part while doing so requires a more focused 
and alternative enforcement approach.
This part of the article proposes such an approach, after revisiting the 
basics of restorative justice (a.). It will propose the establishment and 
setup of mixed public-private “antitrust trust funds”. Antitrust trust funds 
would be publicly regulated private associations set up with the specific 
purpose of rendering restorative justice processes more available and vis-
ible to victims and offenders of competition law infringements. A form of 
consensual dispute settlement overseen by public authorities, funds could 
57 Article 19(2), 2014 Directive.
58 Article 18(3), 2014 Directive.
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bring the advantages of collective actions before the courts, yet also alle-
viating the disadvantages that type of claims may bring. It deserves to be 
clarified, at this stage, that the proposal to set up antitrust trust funds is 
just one possible way to enhance restorative justice processes in EU com-
petition law enforcement. This proposal should therefore and above all be 
understood as a means to stimulate academic and policy debates on how 
to move those concerns forward within the current EU competition law 
enforcement framework.
After explaining how the setup of antitrust trust funds could be envis-
aged (b.), it will distinguish the setup of trust funds from collective action-
based settlement systems that would attain similar objectives (c.). However, 
even if that idea were pushed forward, limited legal yet significant practi-
cal limits would remain in setting up such trust funds as a matter of EU 
law (d.). Nevertheless, considering this option at least as an alternative or 
complement to class actions would thus seem a road worth taking at this 
stage, if and to the extent that more focused attention on restorative justice 
is indeed an ambition or objective of EU competition law enforcement.
a. Revisiting restorative justice
Within the field of criminal justice, the whole of those techniques are often 
called restorative, rather than corrective justice. Attention to the processes 
and conditions of restorative justice has given rise to a sub-field in criminal 
justice scholarship exploring other forms of correction and rendering jus-
tice. This kind of restorative justice has been defined by John Braithwaite, 
one of its most important scholars, as “a process in which all the stake-
holders affected by an injustice have the opportunity to discuss the conse-
quences of the injustice and what might be done to put them right. This is 
a process conception of restorative justice by which what is to be restored 
is left open. Rather, the form of restoration of victims, of offenders and of 
communities that count are those found to be important in such a restora-
tive justice process. Beyond the process conception, there is also a values 
conception of restorative justice. The key value is that because injustice 
hurts, justice should heal”.59
59 John Braithwaite, “The fundamentals of restorative justice”, in A Kind of Mending: Restorative 
Justice in the Pacific Islands, ed. Sinclair Dinnen et al. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2003), 35. A similar 
definition is used in point 3 of the Council of Europe’s October 2018 non-binding Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2018)8 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning restorative justice in 
criminal matters, http://search.coe.int.
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This general description contains three elements important in the con-
text of competition law enforcement as well. First, restorative justice con-
cerns a variety of processes. Those processes can vary between very formal 
and legalised processes, forming part of institutionalised mediation efforts 
that are obligatory prior to a sentence being imposed60 and most informal 
meetings between victims and offenders, often operating in the shadow of 
the traditional justice system.61 The idea of restorative justice covers a wide 
array of processes that can include, yet also significantly go beyond award-
ing monetary damages to victims of infringements of legal provisions. 
Second, those processes involve all stakeholders concerned. That means 
that in principle, restorative justice is premised upon the idea of dialogue 
between all those involved in the violation of legal provisions. Of course, 
that concerns above all the victim, yet also the community or society at 
large. In order to institutionalise a process of restorative justice, third par-
ties can be called upon to take part in restorative justice conversations. 
Third, conversations are central to the idea of restorative justice.62 In order 
to resolve baseline inequalities caused by an infringer, a process of dia-
logue has been set up between the victim and the offender, and, if neces-
sary, other members of a society.63 Such dialogues – or conferences64 – can 
take the format of a dialogue between two private individuals, overseen 
and guided by a mediator, advanced settlement talks between a prosecut-
ing service and an offender of laws that go against public order (such as 
competition law provisions) or more structured talks taking place between 
victims, offenders and the community in which they are/were active.65 One 
of the essential elements of restorative justice is the fact that a direct dia-
logue takes place. Without such a dialogue, reaching a restorative solution 
60 See, for that conception, Andrew Brady Spalding, “Restorative justice for multinational corpora-
tions”, Ohio State Law Journal 76, no. 2 (2015): 397.
61 See points 15-20 of the Council of Europe’s October 2018 Recommendation.
62 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: Restorative Justice for Our Times, Second Edition (Harrisonsburg: 
Herald Press, 2015), 338.
63 Giuseppe Maglione, “Discursive fields and subject positions: Becoming ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and 
‘community’ in restorative justice”, Restorative Justice 2, no. 3 (2014), 327-348.
64 Braithwaite, “The fundamentals of restorative justice”, 40.
65 See, for that variety, Emmanuela Biffi and Tim Chapman, Restorative Justice Responses to 
Conflicts in Intercultural Settings: Practice Guidelines (Leuven: European Forum for Restorative 
Justice, 2015), http://alternativefilms.euforumrj.org/e-books/.
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capable of bringing the justice equilibrium back would appear difficult in 
practice.66
Another essential element of this dialogue is that both victim and 
offender have to be willing to engage in such a dialogue.67 If one of the 
parties refuses to do so, restorative justice potential is deemed limited and 
restorative justice processes are not likely to be initiated.68
Understood in that sense, restorative justice has given rise to the organi-
sation of numerous types of conferences – with varying degrees of suc-
cess – in relation to particular types of crimes, including small property 
crimes69, juvenile crimes70 and domestic violence,71 among other fields. In 
each particular context, restorative justice processes serve to contribute to 
restoring a harmful situation by means of a structured and developed dia-
logue. The outcomes of the dialogue – restoration of some kind – are not 
always set in stone. At times, acknowledging wrongdoing on behalf of the 
offender and an apology may be sufficient for the victim. In other contexts, 
a particular public service obligation undertaken by the offender or the 
payment of compensatory damages of monetary or other nature can also 
be envisaged. The restorative justice process is characterised by a flexibility 
that allows for different types of remedies to be taken into consideration as 
outcomes of that process.
66 See David K. Androff, “Reconciliation in a community-based restorative justice intervention”, 
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 39, no. 4 (2012): 73-96.
67 See point 15 of the Council of Europe’s October 2018 Recommendation. In the same way, the 
2012 EU Victim Rights Directive (Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection 
of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, [2012] O.J. L315/57) 
is premised on the same principle. See also Katrien Lauwaert, “Restorative justice in the 2012 EU 
Victims Directive: A right to quality service, but no right to equal access for victims of crime”, 
Restorative Justice 1, no. 3 (2013): 414-425.
68 See also Carie Menkel-Meadow, “Restorative justice: What is it and how does it work?”, Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science no. 3 (2007): 10.1-10.27.
69 Jo-Anne Wemmers, “Restorative justice for victims of crime: A victim-oriented approach to 
restorative justice”, International Review of Victimology, 9 (2002): 49.
70 Heather Strang, “Justice for victims of young offenders: The centrality of emotional harm and 
restoration”, in Restorative Justice for Juveniles. Conferencing, Mediation and Circles, ed. Allison 
Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 183.
71 John Braithwaite and Heather Strang, “Restorative justice and family violence”, in Restorative 
Justice and Family Violence, ed. John Braithwaite and Heather Strang (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 3-4.
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Although predominantly developed in the realm of criminal justice, 
business regulation in general and competition law72 in particular have 
also been contemplated or implemented.73 It is remarkable, however, that 
restorative justice processes in the context of EU competition law enforce-
ment have been rather limited in scope and scale. When the issue of restor-
ative justice pops up, discussions centre mainly on commitments in public 
enforcement, where a dialogue between the public enforcement author-
ity and the potential offender results in a promise not to keep infringing 
competition laws in the future. As a result, no infringement or sanction 
is established formally under competition law.74 Although this process 
closely resembles restorative justice ambitions outlined here, two marked 
differences can also be pointed at. First, commitment procedures do not 
involve all stakeholders. Only the public enforcement authority represent-
ing the public interest enters into a dialogue with the potential offender. 
Individuals harmed by the infringement only marginally have a right to 
make their voice heard – through the intermediary of the public author-
ity. As a result, the restorative discussion is very limited in nature. Second, 
the outcome of commitment negotiations does not necessarily result in 
a satisfactory restoration of baseline equality for all those harmed by the 
(potential) competition law infringement. Quite on the contrary, a com-
mitment decision implies stopping anticompetitive behaviour for the 
future, but does not address the harm already previously inflicted by that 
very behaviour.75 Individuals harmed by such behaviour would have to rely 
on the private damages actions’ remedy to obtain compensation for the 
harm incurred.
72 See most notably in Australian competition law, Christine Parker, “Restorative justice in busi-
ness regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s use of enforceable 
undertakings”, Modern Law Review, 67, no. 2 (2004): 204-246; Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: 
A Principled Approach (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 307. See also John Braithwaite, “Restorative justice 
for banks through negative licensing”, British Journal of Criminology 49, no. 4 (2009): 439-450.
73 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 336.
74 See Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L 1/1. See, on that 
procedure, Rafael García Valdecasas and Aitor Montesa Lloreda, “A new life for commitment deci-
sions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003? The aftermath of the ECJ Judgment of 29 June 2010 in 
Case C-441/07P, Commission v. Alrosa”, in Today’s Multi-Layered Legal Order: Current Issues and 
Perspectives, ed. Tristan Baumé et al. (Paris: Zutphen, 2011), 99-100.
75 See also Axel Gautier and Nicolas Petit, “Optimal enforcement of competition policy: The com-
mitments procedure under uncertainty”, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509729.
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b.  “Antitrust trust funds”: an alternative intermediate structure promoting 
restorative justice?
To the extent that consensual dispute settlement mechanisms would seem 
possible and even desirable as a matter of EU competition law enforce-
ment, this article would like to propose the establishment of “antitrust trust 
funds” as a way forward in enhancing the restorative justice potential of EU 
competition law enforcement. It is indeed submitted that those funds could 
embrace and render possible both individual and collective consensual set-
tlements in a more informal way, having a wider series of restorative justice 
powers at their disposal. Although setting up such funds may constitute 
a way forward, different important questions need to be addressed as to 
the powers and governance of those funds. As this paper only explores the 
feasibility and possibility of such trust fund solution, it does not answer 
all those questions, but rather chooses to flag them as issues waiting to be 
resolved once the choice for trust funds has been made…
In referring to “antitrust trust funds”, we refer to associations, either at 
EU or Member State level, which do not have a profit-making purpose. 
Those associations, which can have legal personality or not, would be set 
up with the specific purpose of managing restorative processes linked with 
the infringement of EU (and national) competition law provisions. They 
would be independent from government authorities, enforcement bodies 
and the judiciary. As independent bodies, they would be governed, above 
all, by competition law and restorative justice experts, yet remain account-
able to and regulated by public institutions that would control their activi-
ties. To the extent that those bodies contribute to advancing restorative 
justice and victims’ sense of justice confronted with competition law 
infringements, it could be expected that public authorities could bear the 
costs of setting up and funding the operations of those trust funds. To 
distinguish them from public authorities, they could take the format of a 
particular publicly-funded or endorsed non-profit association in so far as 
the relevant legal provisions allow for this.
At first sight, this type of setting closely resembles the charitable trust 
figure under English law. In that configuration, a separate entity is set 
up for a particular public – charitable – purpose. The entity is private in 
nature, having its own staff and resources which are allocated to the pro-
motion or protection of a particular charity.76 A government body, the 
76 See James E. Penner, The Law of Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 490.
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Charity Commission in England and Wales, oversees whether the trust 
is only used for this purpose and whether and how the trust’s assets are 
used in a correct way, and intervenes when necessary.77 In addition, the 
courts can intervene to review the Commission’s decisions.78 The differ-
ence between antitrust trust funds envisaged here and charitable trusts is 
that the latter emerge from private initiatives to invest and contribute to 
certain charitable activities. The proposal made here considers the trust 
funds being created by a public authority in order to advance the causes of 
consensual settlement and restorative justice and to offer a more nuanced 
private enforcement structure. To that extent, the operational costs (staff, 
infrastructure) would most likely be borne by public authorities rather 
than private donations, as is generally the case with charitable trusts.
As associations set up, the antitrust trust funds would manage the 
restorative process accompanying proclaimed or established competition 
law infringements. Here again, important choices would have to be made. 
The first question in that regard is whether any individual could appeal to 
them and be immediately entitled to a restorative conference, or whether 
the fund would need to bring together a group of victims prior to starting 
restorative justice processes. Given that the fund wants to present itself 
as an alternative to collective actions initiated by private and temporary 
associations or organisations, a wider and easier access to its services than 
through a class action should probably be envisaged. A related question 
would concern the relationship between the fund’s intervention and exist-
ing public enforcement mechanisms. As instances of consensual dispute 
settlement, it can be expected that those funds would play a follow-on 
role: they would only come into play once an infringement of competi-
tion law has been established or once it is likely that an infringement has 
taken place and the offender is willing to engage in a dialogue with those 
harmed by that infringement. As such, intervention by the antitrust trust 
fund would require at least some proof, to a required legal standard, that 
a potential competition law infringement has taken place. Nevertheless, 
absent such proof, it is also perfectly imaginable that an offender and a 
victim would like to engage in restorative deliberations, rather than to take 
77 See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission.
78 The appeal takes place before a first-tier tribunal, see https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/first-
tier-tribunal-general-regulatory-chamber; against that tribunal’s decision, an appeal can be made 
before an upper tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber), see https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/
upper-tribunal-tax-and-chancery-chamber. 
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the case to court in a stand-alone private damages action. A possibility for 
individuals, or a sufficiently representative group of individuals, to request 
restorative justice deliberations in the absence of any public enforcement 
to be started could be offered in that regard as well. Whatever the choices 
made in that respect, the fund would have to be accessible for individuals 
and offenders willing to start restorative justice dialogues.
In terms of mandates and powers conferred on the trust funds, the 
name “trust fund” may be a bit misleading. In common legal parlance, 
trust fund refers to a framework for managing a sum of money and seeing 
that this money is spent in a correct manner.79 The role of antitrust trust 
funds could encompass this; yet, it is also much wider than just manag-
ing money. Indeed, the very purpose of those funds would be to offer a 
wider array of restorative justice options, including going beyond mon-
etary compensation. Their primary role would be to offer a basic struc-
ture for consensual dispute settlements in the realm of EU competition 
law. From that point of view, the organisation of restorative justice confer-
ences between individual or groups of victims and (suspected) offenders 
would be the first task. Fund managers or representatives would be asked 
to take on the role of a restorative justice mediator or overseer, structuring 
and guiding the dialogue between the different parties if necessary. That 
fund-associated mediator would also engage in preliminary conversations 
with both offender and victim to question whether a restorative confer-
ence could be set up indeed and what the expectations of both sides are. 
Following those early contacts, the fund representatives would actively 
have to call on other stakeholders to express their interest and give those 
stakeholders the opportunity to be heard. As such, individual victims and 
representatives of society at large can all be called upon to engage in a 
restorative dialogue, structured and overseen by the fund. At the outcome 
of such dialogue, appropriate redress mechanisms can be envisaged. It is in 
that context that different options should be left to the fund to explore and 
propose. One solution could consist in a formal apology and acknowledge-
ment of wrong (potentially accompanied by a promise from victims not 
to claim monetary damages later), a decision to restore the damage done 
by doing something for society at large, or a decision expressing willing-
ness to compensate all victims. In the last situation, it could be envisaged 
that the offender(s) donate(s) a sum of money to the trust fund, which will 
79 See https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/trust%20fund%20doctrine.
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be responsible for distributing it to known and potentially still unknown 
competition law victims or to causes closely associated with the com-
petition law violation which took place. The fund would be tasked with 
managing those funds and overseeing their distribution and it could be 
expected that EU-wide distribution guidelines or principles on how to 
distribute fund revenues to particular victims would be developed in that 
regard. Just like in private damages actions, the quantification of harm 
and the determination of the amount of compensation promises to be a 
complicated exercise. The flexibility of restorative justice approaches could 
perhaps tolerate more flexibility in the distribution of fund revenues as 
well. That being the case – as some victims may not want money as com-
pensation – it has to be ensured that fundamental legal principles, such as 
equal treatment and legal certainty, will also be respected by those funds. 
An overseeing body similar to the Charity Commission in England would 
have to play a fundamental role in ensuring respect for such principles.
Agreements concluded in the context of the fund’s activities could be 
subsequently formalised by either an administrative or judicial decision, 
resulting in judges retaining the final authority. It goes without saying that 
damages awarded within that context would then result in a restriction on 
the ability to claim monetary damages on the basis of the 2014 Directive.
In terms of governance, it could be imagined that the “antitrust trust 
fund” would be governed by a board of overseers and a management board 
comprising experts in restorative justice and competition law and would 
be tasked, in the first place, with the organisation of restorative conferences 
between offender and victims. If it turns out both offender and victims 
want to engage in such conversations to talk about the damages done and 
the repairs that could be envisaged, the fund could formally start up con-
tacts, engage in communications seeking to find other victims and start 
up the restorative conference. The board of overseers could then be asked 
to validate proposed decisions and put them into operation. A government 
department or a judge could be tasked with overseeing their implementa-
tion, intervening whenever necessary. In any case, a judge would have the 
final authority to deal with claims regarding misapplication of the law by 
trust fund authorities or by overseeing bodies.
The abovementioned reflections demonstrate that it is not entirely inap-
propriate to envisage a structure in which different restorative justice initia-
tives could be embedded. As the European Union competition law enforce-
ment system is characterised by a strong focus on public enforcement, it 
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would not seem entirely inappropriate to allow public authorities to play 
a leading role in setting up more developed restorative justice-focused 
arrangements as well. Antitrust trust funds, although private associations, 
would be sponsored by public authorities and would allow for restorative 
justice values to be firmly and directly available to those seeking justice 
after being confronted with competition law violations.
c.  Antitrust trust funds and collective action-based settlements: similarities 
and differences
At first sight, the proposal to design antitrust trust funds closely resem-
bles a consensual dispute settlement mechanism currently in the process 
of being deliberated in the realm of EU consumer law. On 11 April 2018, 
the European Commission decided to propose a new deal for consumers, 
involving the replacement of a 2009 Directive requiring Member States to 
introduce the remedy of injunction80 by a Directive imposing the setup of 
collective or class- actions in this field of law. Such actions can be intro-
duced by a so-called qualified entity representing consumers’ interests.81 
Qualified entities have to be non-profit entities, either created ad hoc for 
the purpose of one collective action or more stable organisations in accord-
ance with national law. They need to have a sufficient amount of financial 
resources and rules in place that avoid third parties having an influence 
on their actions.82 Those entities may start injunction or compensatory 
actions in court on behalf of a group of consumers, who may be explicitly 
required to join the action.83 Although court-centred, the Directive also 
provides for out-of-court settlement opportunities. According to Article 
8 of the proposed Directive, Member States may provide that a qualified 
entity and a trader who have reached a settlement regarding redress for 
consumers affected by an allegedly illegal practice of that trader can jointly 
request a court or administrative authority to approve it. Such a request 
should be admitted by the court or administrative authority only if there 
is no other ongoing representative action in front of the court or admin-
istrative authority of the same Member State regarding the same trader 
80 EC, Proposal for a Directive on representative actions (hereafter 2018 Commission proposal).
81 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunc-
tions for the protection of consumers’ interests (Codified version), [2009] O.J. L110/30.
82 Articles 4 and 9, 2018 Commission proposal.
83 Article 6 (1), final sentence, 2018 Commission proposal: A Member State may require the man-
date of the individual consumers concerned before a declaratory decision is made or a redress 
order is issued.
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and regarding the same practice. A settlement can take place either on the 
initiative of the qualified entity and the trader or on request of the court 
or the administrative authority overseeing the process.84 In the latter case, 
the settlement has to be reached within a certain time limit. Failure to 
do so will result in the collective action being continued.85 The court or 
administrative authority shall assess the legality and fairness of the set-
tlement, taking into consideration the rights and interests of all parties, 
including the consumers concerned.86 If that is the case, they will declare 
the settlement binding. On top of that, individual consumers will have to 
decide explicitly whether they accept to be bound by the settlement. In 
case they do not, they can continue or lodge an individual action before 
the Member States’ courts.87 In terms of redress, the Directive provides for 
the following remedies to be accepted or proposed: compensation, repair, 
replacement, price reduction, contract termination or reimbursement 
of the price paid, as appropriate.88 The proposal has subsequently been 
taken up by the Council and the European Parliament. In March 2019, the 
Parliament reached an agreement, transmitting matters to the Council, 
which will likely take a position later that year. According to the revised 
proposal approved by the European Parliament, qualified entities are to 
be called qualified representative and the settlement is to be made binding 
on all consumers, deleting the exception that consumers can choose not 
to accept the settlement.89 At the time of writing, it remains to be seen to 
what extent the Council will propose additional modifications.
At first sight, the settlement procedure put in place in this related field of 
EU law bears significant similarities with the antitrust trust fund proposals 
made here. A particular entity can engage in out-of-court settlements with 
a (potential) offender, resulting in a variety of remedies to be proposed. 
A court or supervisory authority can declare, in a subsequent stage, the 
settlement binding on all consumers. A settlement can end the collective 
action, or at least suspend it. In addition, the Directive does not interfere 
84 Article 8(2) 2018 Commission proposal.
85 Article 8(3) 2018 Commission proposal.
86 Article 8(4) 2018 Commission proposal.
87 Article 8(6) 2018 Commission proposal.
88 Article 6(1) 2018 Commission proposal.
89 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0222_EN.html?redirect for 
the text approved by the European Parliament.
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with the public enforcement powers of Member States’ authorities, which 
have been subject to a different, yet related legislative proposal.90
Despite those similarities, two major differences remain between this 
system and the antitrust trust funds proposed here. First, the qualified rep-
resentatives acting in collective settlement procedures can be associations 
created for only a limited duration and by representative private organisa-
tions. The proposal to establish antitrust trust funds would require some 
public intervention in the setup and organisation of those funds, in order 
to ensure their capacity to act as intermediaries in bringing justice to 
private claimants or groups of private claimants in a more informal way 
and with a publicly-structured institutional framework that allows varie-
ties of private enforcement to take place. Second, the Directive allows for 
a variety of redress possibilities to remain in place, yet also and overall 
limits those to direct or indirect monetary compensations. The powers 
of the antitrust trust funds to engage in restorative justice dialogues and 
conferences would include, yet also go beyond, direct or indirect mon-
etary compensation. As such, the funds’ powers would be more extensive 
than the possibilities to settle envisaged in the proposed collective action 
Directive in this field. Despite those differences, the EU’s clear ambition 
to have qualified representatives settle matters in a somewhat restorative 
justice-oriented way demonstrates at least that antitrust trust funds could 
be taken seriously as a way forward within the context of EU competition 
law enforcement as well.
d. Legal and practical limits to setting up antitrust “trust funds”
Although setting up antitrust trust funds may seem a possible way forward 
in enhancing restorative justice in the realm of private enforcement of EU 
competition law, the creation of such funds is likely to encounter both legal 
(i.) and practical (ii.) limits. Should a decision indeed be taken to put such 
mechanisms in place, discussions will likely focus on those limits.
90 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards better enforce-
ment and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules, COM2018(185) final, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0185&from=EN.
M&CLR_III_2.indd   39 02/12/2019   16:02:51
40  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019 / 15-49
i. Legal limits
In terms of legal limits, one may wonder at which level trust funds would 
have to be set up, whether the EU would have a competence to set those 
funds up and whether the current 2014 Directive would allow for them.
First, the governance levels on which a trust fund would have to be set 
up need to be determined. One could imagine the Member States setting 
up such funds, and the EU also setting up an EU-wide fund for cross-
border infringements of a sufficiently significant nature. At Member State 
level, it could be accepted that the EU requires Member States to set up 
such funds. After all, in other contexts, the EU has also requested Member 
States to set up independent public authorities tasked with overseeing EU 
law.91 It would not be surprising that, as a matter of principle, the EU can 
also require the setup of publicly funded private associations charged with 
restorative justice tasks. Even though the application of EU competition 
law is an exclusive competence conferred on the European Union92, EU 
law allows for the delegation of such powers to the Member States.93 At EU 
level, one could additionally imagine a body with EU legal personality to 
be set up in that regard, charged with restorative processes of a transna-
tional nature. Although the EU has set up or delegated powers to private 
bodies in the past, the continuous impact of the Meroni doctrine and the 
limits it places on the powers of EU bodies94 may warrant a solution out-
side the EU legal framework.95 In that context, the creation of a European 
Stability Mechanism and a Single Resolution Board in the realm of the 
monetary and banking Union could serve as examples.96 In any case, when 
91 See, by way of example, in the field of data protection, Articles 51-52 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural per-
sons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] O.J. L119/1.
92 Article 3(1)(b) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
93 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, “Sharing powers within exclusive competences: Rethinking EU 
antitrust law enforcement”, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 12 (2016): 49-79.
94 Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies. Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU 
Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 432.
95 Bruno De Witte, “Responses and the EU Legal order: Increased institutional variation or consti-
tutional mutation?”, European Constitutional Law Review 11, no. 3 (2015): 434-457.
96 See, on those mechanisms, Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe. Comparative 
Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 352; Gianno 
Lo Schiavo, The Role of Financial Stability in EU Law and Policy (The Hague: Kluwer, 2017), 300; 
Vestert Borger, The Transformation of the Euro: Law, Contract, Solidarity (Leiden University, PhD 
thesis, 2018).
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setting up a fund like this at the EU level, careful attention will have to be 
paid to the limits posited by the principle of conferral and the limits placed 
on delegation of powers in the EU legal order.
Second, it is believed that Articles 103 and 114 TFEU combined could 
serve as a legal basis for the setup of both Member States’ and EU trust 
funds as well. This dual legal basis has been relied on for the 2014 Directive 
and could be used as a basis for further restorative justice-focused instru-
ments as well. In that context, the EU legislator stated that “[a]s the differ-
ences in the liability regimes applicable in the Member States may nega-
tively affect both competition and the proper functioning of the internal 
market, it is appropriate to base this Directive on the dual legal bases of 
Articles 103 and 114 TFEU”.97 The same reasoning essentially works for any 
steps further to streamline private enforcement, consensual dispute settle-
ment mechanisms and restorative justice initiatives within the framework 
of EU competition law.
Third, questions may also arise as to the compatibility of antitrust trust 
funds with the spirit of the 2014 Directive. With regard to that question, 
it is submitted that the Directive, by allowing for consensual dispute set-
tlement mechanisms to be put in place, would essentially promote a more 
streamlined consensual dispute settlement mechanism as well. Given the 
way in which such systems are presently facilitated by Article 18 of the 
Directive, a more streamlined approach to them would certainly be com-
patible with the overall objectives of that Directive.
It follows from the foregoing that the setup of antitrust trust funds 
would as such encounter no significant legal problems from an EU law 
point of view. The only difficulty would be to set up an EU-wide trust 
fund; at Member State level, the creation of such funds could be demanded 
by means of EU secondary legislation, if the EU legislator (including the 
Member States) manages to reach an agreement on that point during leg-
islative deliberations.
ii. Practical limits
In terms of practical limits that could hinder the operations of trust funds, 
their relationship with existing public and private enforcement mecha-
nism is likely to raise several questions. Two main considerations deserve 
to be developed here.
97 Recital 8 2014 Directive.
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First, the major practical limit to setting up “trust funds” would relate 
to the added value of such trust funds in terms of incentives. It is true that 
funds could give victims of anticompetitive behaviour a simpler and clearer 
venue through which they can try to seek and obtain compensation. At 
the same time, however, one can legitimately wonder why an undertaking 
having (potentially) infringed competition law would be willing to engage 
in restorative justice talks through a publicly established body. Although 
research on incentives in restorative justice suggests that perpetrators may 
be willing to do so out of shame when the initiative has been taken by one 
or more victims and appeal is made to their social responsibility98, it could 
also be imagined that undertakings would not be willing to engage in such 
more consensual type of dispute resolution without proper incentives to 
do so. From that perspective, it would not be unimaginable to envisage 
mechanisms pushing undertakings towards restorative dispute resolution. 
One could think of public enforcement sanctions being lowered if and to 
the extent that a willingness to engage in restorative justice is present or, 
inversely, to foresee higher fines for those undertakings refusing to engage 
in restorative practices. In the same way, the threat of higher damages 
awards absent restorative justice willingness may also be an additional 
trigger. In any case, when setting up mechanisms like the ones proposed 
here, incentivising infringing undertakings needs to be taken seriously.
Second, in addition to incentives for infringers to engage in restorative 
justice processes, there is the question as to what extent restorative jus-
tice initiatives are to relate to both existing public enforcement and private 
damages actions. In terms of the latter, the solution seems rather simple. 
The development of antitrust trust funds at national level would be a more 
coherent and streamlined way of setting up consensual dispute settlement 
mechanisms in compliance with Article 18 of the 2014 Directive. As such, 
the rule stated in there that limitation periods are suspended and that set-
tled results have an impact on the amount of compensation that can be 
requested remain applicable indeed. What would be required, however, 
are rules establishing to what extent confessions and restorative proposals 
made in the context of restorative justice dialogues result in a loss of the 
right to file a claim for compensatory damages. Article 18 of the Directive 
gives some guidance in that regard, yet a more full-fledged consensual 
98 See, by way of example of a much larger body of literature, Tom Tyler, “Restorative justice and 
procedural justice: Dealing with rule breaking”, Journal of Social Issues 62 (2006): 321.
M&CLR_III_2.indd   42 02/12/2019   16:02:51
43Private Damages Actions in EU Competition Law and Restorative Justice | Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel
restorative justice-oriented dispute settlement mechanism would require 
more detailed rules to be established. In the absence of such rules, offenders 
may not be willing to agree to restorative justice dialogues being initiated.
As far as public enforcement is concerned, it has to be emphasised that 
the antitrust trust funds aim to contribute to restorative justice for private 
individuals or for groups of individuals. As such, their activities essen-
tially concern private enforcement. Nothing would seem to impede that, 
once the potentiality or presence of an infringement has become clear, 
victim and offender can decide to start up this process, in parallel with 
public enforcement. Just like with private damages actions, however, a 
framework will have to be put in place regarding exchanges of informa-
tion. In that context, though, it deserves to be mentioned that restorative 
justice approaches function generally on a much more informal scale than 
traditional litigation. Based upon trust and dialogue, restorative justice 
arrangements require to a lesser extent the proof of an infringement prior 
to take restorative action. In the same way, the outcome of restorative pro-
cesses is not necessarily and immediately the payment of compensatory 
damages. As a result, even in the absence of infringement decisions or of 
proof to a requisite legal standard of competition law violations, restora-
tive justice initiatives could be initiated if both offender and (a group of) 
victims agree to it.
Inversely, however, questions may arise as to the extent to which confes-
sions or acknowledgements of wrongdoing made in a private enforcement 
restorative justice procedure impact on public enforcement. In criminal 
justice scholarship, restorative justice is presented as an alternative to clas-
sical crime and punishment approaches.99 In competition law, however, 
private enforcement is seen as a complement to public enforcement. The 
major issue to be addressed in this context would therefore be whether 
restorative justice-based dialogues could entirely replace public enforce-
ment, or should be seen as a complement to it. If they are a complement, 
measures should be in place not to discourage the use of such proce-
dures, by allowing public authorities to short-cut their own procedures 
and imposing a fine at the outcome of the process. Given the importance 
that public enforcement plays in EU competition law, it is likely that such 
rules may be necessary should one decide to proceed along this way. It can 
be expected that this is the most important practical limit to setting up a 
99 See Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses.
M&CLR_III_2.indd   43 02/12/2019   16:02:51
44  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019 / 15-49
full-fledged restorative justice-oriented framework. Absent rules govern-
ing the co-existence of both sets of enforcement structures, it will be dif-
ficult to guarantee an effectively functioning antitrust trust fund as pro-
posed here.
It follows from the foregoing that as long as public enforcement remains 
the key focus of EU competition law enforcement, restorative justice pro-
cesses are likely to play only subsidiary and subordinate roles compared to 
public enforcement. That does not mean, however, that the proposals made 
here may have no chance of being implemented. It is submitted indeed 
that paying closer attention to restorative justice-oriented processes and 
implementing them in a more streamlined way may be a first step towards 
a reframed public-private enforcement balance in the EU. Article 18 of the 
2014 Directive has made a modest step in that direction. It would therefore 
not be completely unexpected if the legislator decides to continue the effort 
and move forward with restorative justice-oriented processes. Doing so 
would nevertheless require making policy choices. For that, a more dem-
ocratic debate on how to proceed in this field would be most welcome. 
In addition, more comparative research on the usefulness of private trust 
funds, settlement bodies in U.S. collective action law and restorative jus-
tice in competition law would be necessary as well. It can only be hoped 
that the new European Parliament, in dialogue with the newly composed 
European Commission, would take steps going in this direction. 
4. Conclusion
This article addressed the 2014 Private Damages’ Directive limited atten-
tion for restorative justice processes. It revisited the scope and focus of that 
Directive prior to concluding that a limited understanding of corrective 
justice underlies this legal instrument. Aiming to look beyond that nar-
row understanding, the article subsequently proposed an alternative way 
forward, consisting in the setup of publicly funded, yet privately managed 
antitrust trust funds. Discussing the different formats and open questions 
and choices having to be made when considering such setup, the article at 
the very least called for a widening of the debate on the desirability and 
effectiveness of restorative justice-oriented processes and features within 
EU competition law enforcement. Opening that debate, it was submitted, 
could lead to a fresh look upon the relationship between public and pri-
vate enforcement in this field and upon ways to rebalance both types of 
enforcement.
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